The Shift from Active to Passive Investing: Risks to Financial Stability?

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The Shift from Active to Passive Investing: Risks to Financial Stability?

Kenechukwu Anadu, CFA, Mathias Kruttli, Patrick McCabe, and Emilio Osambela

The past two decades have seen a significant shift from active to passive investment strategies. We examined how this shift affects financial stability through its impacts on (1) funds’ liquidity and redemption risks, (2) asset market volatility, (3) asset management industry concentration, and (4) comovement of asset returns and liquidity. Overall, the shift appears to be increasing some risks and reducing others. Some passive strategies amplify market volatility, and the shift has increased industry concentration but has diminished some liquidity and redemption risks. Evidence on the links between indexing and comovement of asset returns and liquidity is mixed.

Over the past two decades, there has been a substantial shift in the asset management industry from active to passive investment strategies. Active strategies give portfolio managers discretion to select individual securities, generally with the investment objective of outperforming a previously identified benchmark. In contrast, passive strategies, including indexing, use rules-based investing, often to track an index by holding all of its constituent assets or an automatically selected representative sample of those assets. To be sure, the distinction between active and passive investing is not always clear-cut; for example, some nominally active investment funds behave passively by following so-called closet indexing strategies (Cremers and Petajisto 2009). Even so, the shift toward passive investing stands out as one of the key developments in asset management in recent years.

Using a framework that incorporates existing research and our own original analysis, this article explores the potential implications of the active-to-passive shift for financial stability—a topic of growing concern. The possible effects of asset management activities on financial stability have drawn increasing attention from academic researchers, regulators, investment management professionals, and individual investors.

We found that the active-to-passive shift is affecting the composition of financial stability risks; even as the shift is increasing some risks, it appears to be mitigating others.

Disclosure: The authors report no conflicts of interest.

PL Credits: 0.75
Our analysis is relevant for regulators, academic researchers, investment managers, and individual investors. For example, our finding that investors in passive mutual funds are less reactive to performance than active-fund investors is relevant to investment professionals, who must manage liquidity and redemtion risks, as well as to regulators, who are concerned about the risk of destabilizing “fire sales.” More broadly, our study informs investors and investment managers about some of the externalities—that is, positive or negative unpriced side effects—of their decisions that can affect financial stability. Policymakers have a role in addressing these financial market externalities, and investors and investment managers have a stake, too, because financial stability is an important marketwide risk factor that ultimately affects investment performance.

The shift to passive investing is a global phenomenon. In the United States, as shown in Figure 1, the shift has been especially evident among open-end mutual funds (MFs) and in the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which are largely passive investment vehicles.\(^2\) As of March 2020, passive funds accounted for 41% of combined US MF and ETF assets under management (AUM), up from 3% in 1995 and 14% in 2005. This shift for MFs and ETFs has occurred across asset classes: Passive funds made up 48% of the AUM in equity funds and 30% in bond funds as of March 2020, whereas both shares were less than 5% in 1995.\(^3\) Similar shifts to passive management appear to be occurring in other types of investments and vehicles. For example, the share of assets in university endowments and foundations invested in passive vehicles has reportedly increased substantially in recent years (Randall 2017; Smith 2017), although a challenge in assessing the full scope of the shift to passive management in the United States is the lack of data on strategies for many investment vehicles, such as bank collective investment funds and separately managed accounts. Moreover, the shift to passive investing is also occurring in other countries (see Bhattacharya and Galpin 2011; BlackRock 2018; Sushko and Turner 2018b).

In addition, passively managed funds hold a rising share of total financial assets. As of March 2020, US stocks held in passive MFs and ETFs accounted for about 14% of the domestic equity market, up from less than 4% in 2005.\(^4\) The aggregate passive share, including passively managed holdings outside of MFs and ETFs, is still larger. For example, BlackRock (2017) estimated that passive investors owned 18% of all global equity at the end of 2016, with most of the holdings outside the MF and ETF sectors.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the active-to-passive shift. The development of the efficient market hypothesis in the 1950s and 1960s

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**Figure 1.** Total Assets in Active and Passive MFs and ETFs and Passive Share of Aggregate Assets in MFs and ETFs

![Figure 1. Total Assets in Active and Passive MFs and ETFs and Passive Share of Aggregate Assets in MFs and ETFs](image)

Source: Morningstar.
The Shift from Active to Passive Investing

called into question the role of active selection of securities to “beat the market” and indicated that investors should hold the market portfolio itself (Bhattacharya and Galpin 2011). The introduction of the first stock index funds in the 1970s made passive investments in the market portfolio a practical option for retail investors. The relatively lower costs associated with passive investing and evidence of underperformance of active managers have probably contributed as well. Another factor is the growing popularity of ETFs, which are largely passive investment vehicles. Finally, greater regulatory focus on the fees of investment products may have encouraged the financial industry to offer low-cost, passive products to individual investors (see BlackRock 2018; Sushko and Turner 2018b).

The shift to passive investing has sparked wide-ranging research and commentary, including claims about effects on industry concentration, asset prices, volatility, price discovery, market liquidity, competition, and corporate governance. Moreover, the growth of passive investing can be seen as part of a larger shift to systematic investment strategies, including smart-beta and quantitative investment strategies, which may have significant implications for asset prices, risk management, and market microstructure (Giamouridis 2017). This article’s contribution is its uniquely comprehensive examination of the potential repercussions of the active-to-passive shift for financial stability—that is, the ability of the financial system to consistently supply the financial intermediation needed to keep the real economy on its growth trajectory (see Rosengren 2011). We examined four types of repercussions of the active-to-passive shift that may have implications for financial stability: (1) effects on funds’ liquidity-transformation and redemption risks, particularly in the MF and ETF sectors; (2) growth of passive investing strategies that amplify volatility; (3) increased asset management industry concentration; and (4) changes in asset valuations, volatility, and comovement.

Our findings, summarized briefly in Exhibit 1, suggest that the shift from active to passive investment is affecting the composition of financial stability risks by mitigating some and increasing others. For example, the growth of ETFs, which are largely passive vehicles that do not redeem in cash, has likely reduced risks arising from liquidity transformation in investment vehicles. Moreover, we found some evidence that investor flows for passive MFs are less responsive to fund performance than the flows of active funds, so passive funds may face a lower risk of destabilizing redemptions in episodes of financial stress.

In contrast, some specialized passive investing strategies, such as those used by the relatively small sub-sector of leveraged and inverse ETFs, amplify market volatility. And as the shift to passive vehicles has

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact of Active-to- Passive Shift on Financial Stability Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Liquidity transformation and redemptions</td>
<td>Funds redeem daily in cash regardless of portfolio liquidity; investor flows respond procyclically to performance.</td>
<td>Reduces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investing strategies that amplify volatility</td>
<td>Leveraged and inverse funds require high-frequency “momentum” trades, even in the absence of flows.</td>
<td>Increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Asset management industry concentration</td>
<td>Passive asset managers are more concentrated than active ones, so the shift to passive increases concentration.</td>
<td>Increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Changes in asset valuations, volatility, and comovement</td>
<td>Index-inclusion effects: Assets added to indexes experience changes in returns and liquidity, including greater comovement.</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
increased asset management industry concentration, it has fostered the growth of some very large asset management firms and probably exacerbated potential risks that might arise from serious operational problems at those firms. Finally, since passive funds use indexed-investing strategies, these funds’ growth could contribute to “index-inclusion” effects on assets that are members of indexes, such as greater comovement of returns and liquidity, although available evidence on trends in comovement and their links to passive investing is mixed.

Most of the financial stability issues we examined are broadly relevant for passive investment vehicles, although our discussion often centers on MFs and ETFs, in part because extensive data are available about them. However, in the next section, we focus specifically on MFs, because investment funds that must offer daily cash redemptions have more acute liquidity-transformation risks than most other passive funds. In that section, we note that a shift to passive MFs and ETFs may reduce these risks.

The active-to-passive shift currently shows no signs of abating, and our framework for analyzing financial stability effects is useful for assessing how risks are likely to evolve if the shift continues. For example, the shift probably will continue to reduce risks arising from liquidity transformation as long as passive MF flows remain less responsive to fund performance than active MF flows and as long as growth in the ETF sector is dominated by funds that do not redeem exclusively in cash; of course, these outcomes are not sureties. Meanwhile, the shift is likely to heighten risks arising from asset management industry concentration and some index-inclusion effects. However, an important caveat to extrapolating these impacts forward is that the repercussions of passive investing ultimately may slow its growth, particularly if index-inclusion effects distort asset prices and increase the profitability of active investing strategies that exploit these distortions.

In addition, our framework may be useful for examining the financial stability implications of broader trends in investing, such as the increasing use of systematic investment strategies (Giamouridis 2017). For example, the stability effects of the increase in smart-beta investing will depend in part on the extent to which it is used in ETFs that redeem in kind, rather than in mutual funds that offer cash redemptions daily. In addition, the stability effects of such trends will depend on whether growth increases asset management concentration by occurring disproportionately in firms that are already very large.

### Effects on Funds’ Liquidity-Transformation and Redemption Risks

Academic researchers and policymakers have argued that liquidity-transformation and redemption risks in the asset management industry may pose risks to financial stability (see, for example, Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz, and Shin 2018; Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng 2017; Financial Stability Oversight Council 2016; Financial Stability Board 2017). These risks are most salient for MFs and other products that offer daily redemptions in cash regardless of the liquidity of their portfolios.7 Cash redemptions may create first-mover advantages for redeeming investors, which in turn could lead to destabilizing redemptions and fire sales by the funds. Moreover, because MF investors typically chase performance—that is, they buy (sell) shares of funds that have recently registered positive (negative) returns—a negative shock to asset prices might cause MF outflows that further depress prices and amplify the effects of the shock. We found that the shift to passive investing is likely reducing liquidity-transformation and redemption risks, particularly for MFs and ETFs.

#### Growth of ETFs Reduces Liquidity Transformation.

ETFs are overwhelmingly passive investment vehicles.8 Unlike MFs, which offer cash to redeeming investors, ETFs typically redeem via in-kind exchanges of the ETF’s shares for “baskets” of the securities that make up the fund. As of March 2018, ETFs that redeemed exclusively in kind accounted for 92% of ETF assets.9 By offering securities for securities, ETFs minimize liquidity transformation; redemptions from the ETF typically do not diminish its liquidity or increase incentives for other investors to redeem shares.10 Hence, as long as the largely passive ETF sector is dominated by funds that redeem in kind, a shift of assets from MFs to ETFs reduces the likelihood that large-scale redemptions would force funds to engage in destabilizing fire sales. That said, ETFs investing in less liquid assets have grown rapidly in recent years and are more likely than other ETFs to use cash redemptions; further expansion of ETFs that redeem exclusively in cash could erode the stability-enhancing effects of the shift to passive investing via ETFs.11

#### Passive MFs Have Lower Performance-Related Redemption Risks.

We provide new evidence that investor flows for passive MFs are less performance sensitive than those of active funds, so...
passive MFs appear to be less likely than active funds to suffer large redemptions following poor returns. Our focus is on the sensitivity of MF flows to performance. ETF flows also respond to performance, but as noted above, redemptions from ETFs are largely paid in kind and thus do not have the same liquidity-draining effects as MF redemptions.

Most of the academic literature on MF redemption risk has focused on the relationship between flows and performance for actively managed MFs. For example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) showed that actively managed MFs experience inflows following positive returns. More recently, Goldstein et al. (2017) found that variation in liquidity among active bond funds contributes to differences in the sensitivity of their flows to performance. Only a few papers have suggested that passively managed investment funds also face a positive flow–performance relationship; for example, Goetzmann and Massa (2003) and Clifford, Fulkerson, and Jordan (2014) showed positive correlation of flows and performance for passive equity MFs and ETFs, respectively. Our analysis is novel in that we focused on how the flow–performance relationship differs for active and passive MFs. We found that a shift to passive funds may be dampening the risk of large, procyclical fund flows and heavy MF redemptions during periods of financial stress.

To illustrate this point, we first examine MF flows during a couple of recent periods of financial strain. Figure 2 shows (1) cumulative net flows for active and passive equity MFs in the depths of the global financial crisis, from December 2007 through mid-2009, and (2) cumulative flows for bond funds during the “Taper Tantrum” in mid-2013. In both cases, even though passive MFs’ returns were at least as poor as those of active funds, passive funds had cumulative inflows and active funds had cumulative outflows. This suggests that the net flows of passive funds may be less reactive to poor returns and that these funds’ growth may be beneficial for financial stability.

We used regressions to provide more direct evidence about differences in the flow–performance relationships for active and passive MFs and to distinguish responses to performance from underlying trends in growth. For funds with each investment objective—domestic equity and corporate bonds—we aggregated monthly net flows and asset-weighted net returns to obtain one observation per month for active funds and one for passive funds. We regressed net flows for each fund type on its contemporaneous and lagged returns and its lagged flows. By analyzing aggregate flows, rather than fund-level flows, we avoided capturing offsetting flows among MFs in a category, which are less important for financial stability than aggregate flows.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report selected results from separate regressions for active and passive US domestic equity funds, respectively, for May 2000 to March 2020. The sensitivity of flows to performance appears to be weaker for passive funds than for active funds. For active funds, a 1% increase in monthly net return is associated with a 0.03% same-month inflow and a 0.01% inflow in the following month (column 1, lines 3 and 4). Given the size of the active domestic equity fund sector ($3.6 trillion in assets as of March 2020), a one standard deviation (5 percentage point) increase in monthly return would be associated with a net inflow that month of $4 billion. In contrast, for passive funds (column 2), the estimated coefficients on contemporaneous and lagged returns are statistically insignificant. These results are comparable to the finding of Dannhauser and Pontiff (2019) that the flow–performance relationship is weaker for passive equity MFs than for active funds.

Column 3 reports the results of a pooled regression of active and passive MFs, now with two observations per month. This regression includes a dummy variable (1 for passive funds, 0 for active) to capture differences in growth rates for active and passive funds. We interact this dummy with Returns to capture differences in flow responses to performance for active and passive funds. The coefficient on the interaction between Passive and Returns is negative and significant (line 5), indicating that the flow–performance relationship is indeed weaker for passive funds.

In the corporate bond sector, passive strategies emerged more recently than for stocks, so the sample period for our bond fund regressions begins in May 2010 and includes only four passive corporate bond funds. We found that although active corporate bond funds have a significant flow response to performance (column 4, lines 3 and 4), passive funds do not (column 5). To be sure, the coefficients on Returns in the passive-fund regression are estimated very imprecisely, perhaps because the small number of passive funds makes their aggregate flows relatively noisy. In the pooled regression, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between Passive and lagged Returns is negative and significant (column 6, line 6), although only at the 10% level.
Figure 2. Cumulative Net Flows and Returns for Active and Passive MFs during Periods of Financial Strain

Cumulative Net Flows from December 2007:
Fraction of December 2007 Assets (%)
Cumulative Return from December 2007 (%)

B. Corporate Bond Mutual Funds: Cumulative Flows and Returns, 2013 Taper Tantrum
Cumulative Net Flows from December 2012:
Fraction of December 2012 Assets (%)
Cumulative Return from December 2012 (%)

Sources: Morningstar; authors’ calculations.
Our finding that passive-fund flows are less reactive to returns than active-fund flows has some theoretical grounding in Berk and Green's (2004) explanation that flows respond to performance because investors are searching for skilled active managers. Investors should have little incentive to chase performance in passive funds, where asset-picking skill is less important. Another possible explanation for our results is that investors use active and passive funds for different purposes; passive funds may be used more for retirement and other long-term goals for which high-frequency performance is less relevant. Finally, active–passive differences might arise because of investor selection: Less performance-sensitive investors may choose passive funds. If so, the growth of passive funds may not be reducing the aggregate reaction of investor flows to performance. Although we cannot rule out a role for this last explanation, the evidence suggests that the shift to passive mutual funds is reducing, at least to some extent, risks arising from heavy mutual fund redemptions during periods of stress.

Looking ahead, whether further shifts toward passive investing continue to reduce redemption risks depends in large part on why passive-fund flows are less sensitive to performance. If investors view passive-fund performance as relatively uninformative about fund managers' skill or investors' own goals, the shift may continue to mitigate risks. However, passive funds themselves could become more sensitive to performance if they grow by attracting more reactive investors from active funds.

### Table 1. Flow–Performance Regressions, Selected Results (t-statistics in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Domestic Equity Funds</th>
<th>US Corporate Bond Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Active Only (2) Passive Only (3) Pooled</td>
<td>(4) Active Only (5) Passive Only (6) Pooled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Constant</td>
<td>-0.054** (2.66)</td>
<td>0.201** (4.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.124 (-1.14)</td>
<td>1.321 (1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Passive</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Returns&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.025** (6.19)</td>
<td>-0.004 (-0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.391** (5.49)</td>
<td>0.514 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Returns&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.010** (2.26)</td>
<td>0.009 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.306** (3.53)</td>
<td>-0.618 (-1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Passive × Returns&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Passive × Returns&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is aggregate net flows (percentage of lagged assets) to mutual funds. Data are monthly. Flows for individual funds were winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels before aggregation. Regressions also include three lags of net flows and two additional lags of both Returns and Passive × Returns.

*Significant at the 10% level.

**Significant at the 5% level.

Sources: Morningstar; authors' calculations.
Growth of Specialized Passive Investment Strategies That Amplify Volatility

Some specialized passive investment strategies may amplify price volatility for the assets they hold by requiring portfolio managers to trade in the same direction as recent market moves, even in the absence of investor flows. These strategies can be used in a variety of investment vehicles, including vehicles that are not SEC-registered investment companies, although most of the academic literature has focused on their use among a relatively small group of ETFs. Cheng and Madhavan (2009) and Tuzun (2014) showed that leveraged and inverse ETFs (LETFs, or “geared” ETFs)—which seek daily returns that are, respectively, positive and negative multiples of an underlying index return—both must trade in the same direction as market moves that occurred earlier in the day. That is, so-called geared passive investment strategies cause both leveraged and inverse ETFs to buy assets (or exposures via swaps or futures) on days when asset prices rise and to sell assets when the market is down.

The rebalancing flows of LETFs pose risks different from those arising from investor flows. Rebalancing activity occurs even if LETFs have no net creations (purchases) or redemptions, and rebalancing flows for individual LETFs can be considerably larger than the typical mutual fund performance-chasing flows that give rise to concerns about liquidity transformation. Moreover, because rebalancing flows are predictable, they probably spur front-running trades in the same direction by opportunistic investors.

Tuzun (2014) provided evidence that rebalancing by LETFs likely contributed to stock market volatility during the financial crisis. Although Ivanov and Lenkey (2018) argued that net investor flows to equity LETFs may offset some of their rebalancing flows, it is unclear whether offsetting investor flows would be reliable enough to mitigate financial stability risks arising from mechanical rebalancing flows during periods of market volatility. Volatility-linked LETFs (and other leveraged and inverse exchange-traded products) likely contributed substantially to an unprecedented spike in stock return volatility, as measured by the Cboe VIX Index, in February 2018, and these products’ rebalancing activities appear to have put downward pressure on stock prices (Kawa and Alloway 2018; Sushko and Turner 2018a).

LETFs have grown in recent years (Figure 3) but are still only a tiny fraction of the ETF sector and represent a very small share of aggregate passively managed fund AUM. Because LETF rebalancing flows increase with the size of these products, their small size has limited their potential to amplify daily price changes. The sector’s small size is probably due, at least in part, to a 2010 SEC moratorium limiting the creation of new LETFs. However, two recent SEC actions would end the moratorium, greenlight creation of

Figure 3. Net Assets of Leveraged and Inverse ETFs

![Net Assets of Leveraged and Inverse ETFs](source: Morningstar)
new LETFs, and facilitate faster growth, which could amplify the sector’s effects on volatility.25

**Increased Asset Management Industry Concentration**

The shift to passive management has contributed to an increase in concentration in the asset management industry because passive asset managers tend to be more concentrated than active ones. Figure 4 illustrates this point using Herfindahl–Hirschman Indexes (HHIs).26 An influx of new passive funds in the early 2000s significantly reduced the HHI for passive funds, but it remained substantially higher than the HHI for active funds. Since 2004, HHIs for passive and active funds have averaged about 2,700 and 460, respectively.27 Thus, the shift to passive investing has put a larger share of industry AUM in the more concentrated passive segment and raised the overall HHI.

Higher concentration for passive funds probably reflects a couple of factors. First, all investment funds experience some economies of scale (and scope), because greater AUM allow fixed costs to be spread over a larger asset base. A countervailing factor for active funds is that the ability to outperform the market may be diminishing in scale (Berk and Green 2004). For passive funds, asset selection ability is less relevant, so scale diseconomies may be less of a brake on growth. Second, on the demand side, because passive funds offer relatively little differentiation of portfolios and manager talent, investors may be more inclined to invest in the lowest-cost funds operated by large asset managers that are able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope.

Given these factors, it may not be surprising that in the past two decades, some asset managers have grown very large in terms of both passive-fund AUM and overall market share. For instance, passive-fund assets managed by Vanguard saw a 19-fold increase between 1999 and 2019. As Table 2 shows, these firms’ overall market shares—for combined active and passive funds—increased markedly over this period.

A financial stability concern related to increased concentration in the asset management industry—and the emergence of some very large asset management firms—arises from the possibility that a significant idiosyncratic event at a very large firm could lead to sudden massive redemptions from that firm’s funds and thus potentially from the asset management industry as a whole. To be sure, past instances of serious problems at asset management firms, such as the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal, do not appear to have caused aggregate problems, because investors appear largely to have moved assets from scandal-tainted mutual funds to other mutual funds (McCabe 2009).

But an operational event, such as a cybersecurity breach that immediately puts investors’ wealth at risk, plausibly could trigger more sudden redemptions, aggregate shifts out of mutual funds, and fire sales with broader financial

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**Figure 4. Concentration of Active and Passive MFs and ETFs**

![Figure 4. Concentration of Active and Passive MFs and ETFs](image)

**Source:** Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
consequences. Indeed, the Financial Stability Oversight Council has warned that a cybersecurity event “could cause a loss of confidence among a broad set of customers or market participants, which could lead to broad asset sales or withdrawals that have destabilizing effects” (Financial Stability Oversight Council 2018, p. 107). Thus, the industry’s increased concentration raises concerns about the repercussions for financial stability of serious problems at very large firms.

Asset management concentration also may affect asset price volatility for other reasons. Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) argued that a concentrated asset management sector may make assets held in investment funds more susceptible to the effects of fund flows. Ben-David, Franzoni, Moussawi, and Sedunov (2019) found that concentration of ownership among large institutional investors, including large asset managers, is associated with increased volatility in underlying stock prices and larger price drops during periods of market turmoil. We explore such effects more thoroughly in the next section.

Changes in Asset Valuations, Volatility, and Comovement

The shift toward passive investing is largely synonymous with an increase in indexed investing, which may be affecting the valuations, returns, and liquidity of financial assets that are included in indexes (for a review, see Wurgler 2011). Some of these “index-inclusion” effects, particularly greater comovement of returns and liquidity, could have repercussions for financial stability by broadening the impact of shocks to asset markets, although this possibility has not been broadly examined. Exhibit 2 briefly summarizes some potential impacts of the active-to-passive shift on index-inclusion effects and financial stability.Æ

Effects on Valuations. Early research on indexing effects examined changes in stock prices when firms were added to or deleted from the S&P 500 Index. Shleifer (1986) first documented a 3%–4% boost to stock prices when firms were added to the S&P 500. This effect is likely driven by demand; index fund managers who replicate an index must buy the stock of each firm that is added to the index. Subsequent papers have generally confirmed a short-term price effect of adding a stock to the S&P 500, but there is no consensus in the academic literature on longer-term effects. Indeed, Patel and Welch (2017) found that stocks no longer experience permanent price increases when they are added to this index.

Nonetheless, to the extent that passive investing is pushing up the prices of index constituents, there may be several potential repercussions for financial stability. First, in theory, rising prices can lead to more indexed investing, and the resulting “index bubble” eventually could burst. However, the scope of such bubbles is probably limited insofar as index-inclusion effects on valuations are largely cross-sectional. That is, documented effects suggest that stock valuations become distorted relative to one another, not necessarily that broader aggregate valuations are distorted relative to fundamentals. For bonds, a second type of repercussion arises when index weights are based on the market value of each firm’s bonds outstanding, which gives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Market Share* (%)</th>
<th>Passive-Fund AUM, December 2019 ($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>10 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock</td>
<td>1 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity</td>
<td>14 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Schwab</td>
<td>0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25 47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asset manager’s market share for all (actively and passively managed) MFs and ETFs. Source: Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
greater weight to more leveraged firms. Sushko and Turner (2018b) argued that the resulting support for leveraged firms’ bond prices may have procyclical impacts on bond markets. Dathan and Davydenko (2018) found that passive-investor demand leads firms to issue larger bonds with lower yields, longer maturities, and fewer investor protections. This finding suggests the shift to passive investing may be contributing to increased corporate leverage by encouraging firms to issue corporate bonds that will be included in indexes.

The inverse effect—the decrease in prices of assets when they are removed from an index—also may affect financial stability. One specific concern arises because about half of all investment-grade corporate bonds outstanding are rated BBB, the lowest investment-grade rating. In an economic downturn, widespread downgrades of these bonds could push them below investment grade and force investment-grade corporate bond MFs and other investors to sell them (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2020; Office of Financial Research 2018; Aramonte and Eren 2019). Although active investment-grade MFs probably also would want to unload such downgraded bonds, passive funds that seek to minimize tracking error relative to a benchmark likely would face more immediate selling pressure.31

**Effects on Volatility.** Some types of indexed investing, particularly those involving ETFs, may amplify the volatility of underlying assets, although effects on aggregate volatility are less clear.32 From an empirical perspective, Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2018) found that stocks with more ETF ownership are more volatile than otherwise similar securities, and they argued that the volatility arising from ETF trading represents a nondiversifiable source of risk, at least in the short term. In similar analyses using higher-frequency data, Goldman Sachs (2019) and Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2019) found that the effect is concentrated near the close of daily trading sessions, and they argued it may be due to the concentration of ETF portfolio trades at that time. In theoretical work, Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018) used a model to show that although ETF trading may lead to pricing distortions for individual ETF-held securities, it can help move aggregate market prices closer to fundamentals. Similarly, Malamud (2016) built a theoretical model to

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<th>Type of Index-Inclusion Effect</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Valuation</td>
<td>Price of asset increases (decreases) when it is added to (removed from) index.</td>
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<td>For equities, valuation effects have declined significantly since 2000; for bonds, little research to date.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>Volatility of asset price increases when asset is added to index.</td>
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<td>Comovement of liquidity</td>
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show that introducing new ETFs may lead to a reduction in volatility and comovement for some assets.

Deviations of ETF share prices from their net asset values—that is, the values of their constituent assets—can also add to market volatility. The authorized participants that buy and sell ETF shares in primary markets normally engage in arbitrage activity to keep deviations small, but they may curtail that activity amid large shocks, which can allow deviations to widen (Pan and Zeng 2019). Some have suggested that large deviations may threaten financial stability. For example, Pagano, Sánchez Serrano, and Zechnner (2019) argued that such deviations may cause investors to “lose faith” in the liquidity provided by ETFs and engage in destabilizing fire sales, although they also noted that the decoupling of ETF share prices from the prices of ETFs’ constituent assets may help stabilize the latter. Another perspective is that even in the extreme, a long-term halt to all primary-market activity for an ETF would effectively convert it to a closed-end fund, which does not pose obvious financial stability risks.

**Effects on Liquidity.** Inclusion in an ETF can increase an asset’s liquidity because it becomes easier to trade as part of the ETF basket, but inclusion also may crowd out trades of individual assets and diminish their liquidity. The net effect depends on the relative magnitude of these two channels, but the research literature does not offer a consensus on which dominates. Dannhauser (2017) showed that ETF ownership is associated with reduced liquidity for investment-grade corporate bonds, but Holden and Nam (2019) found that ETF ownership of high-yield bonds improves their liquidity. In a separate vein, Brogaard, Heath, and Huang (2019) showed that passive equity ETF indexing may have a bifurcating effect on the liquidity of the funds’ constituent assets by improving the liquidity of liquid stocks while making illiquid stocks less liquid.

**Effects on Comovement.** Of particular relevance for financial stability is evidence that indexing may cause greater comovement of asset returns and liquidity, because this effect could broaden the propagation of shocks. For example, some researchers have found that when firms are added to the S&P 500, the systematic risks, or betas, of their stocks increase. This “excess comovement” may result from index fund flows that cause fund managers to buy or sell all stocks in the index simultaneously. Consistent with this explanation, Da and Shive (2018) found evidence that ETF ownership of stocks boosts return comovement.

However, the evidence is mixed on whether return comovement has increased more broadly with the growth of passive investing. Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008, 2010) showed that average return betas for large stocks increased from 1968 to 2008, while those for smaller stocks declined. They argued that growth in indexing affects larger stocks more than smaller ones and can explain these diverging trends. Bolla, Kohler, and Wittig (2016), who examined equity markets in the eurozone, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States, found that betas generally trended up from 2002 to 2014, although the trend appears to have slowed around the time of the financial crisis. In contrast, Chen, Singal, and Whitelaw (2016), who looked more specifically at index-inclusion effects on return betas, did not find evidence of an upward trend in recent years. They reported that adding a stock to the index had a smaller effect on its beta during the period from 2001 to 2012 than in the previous decade, even as indexing had become more common.

Indexed investing also may increase the comovement of liquidity among assets and hence the likelihood that assets become illiquid simultaneously. Kamara et al. (2008, 2010) and Bolla et al. (2016) found upward trends in systematic liquidity in the US equity market and linked them to the increase in institutional and indexed investing. They argued that the correlated trading behavior associated with indexed investing, particularly via ETFs, can cause commonality in liquidity. Similarly, Agarwal, Hanouna, Moussawi, and Stahel (2018) found that ETF ownership significantly increases comovement in the liquidity of underlying stocks.

In sum, a number of studies have suggested that passive investing may be contributing to comovement of asset returns and liquidity and thus may be making financial markets more vulnerable to shocks. However, the evidence on trends and causality is mixed, and the scope of the research on index-inclusion effects has been limited, with a focus on equity markets, particularly in the United States. Additional analysis of the effects on liquidity and comovement for fixed-income instruments and foreign assets would be helpful in assessing how passive investing may be affecting financial stability through index-inclusion effects.

Although the evidence on whether the shift to passive investing has increased index-inclusion effects to date is mixed, it is plausible that a continuation of this shift could contribute to these effects. At the same time, index-inclusion effects may have
feedback effects on the active-to-passive shift itself. For example, if index-related price distortions become more significant over time, they may boost the profitability of active investing strategies that exploit these distortions and ultimately slow the shift to passive investing.

Conclusion
The shift from active to passive investment strategies has profoundly affected the asset management industry in the past two decades, and the ongoing nature of the shift suggests that its effects will continue to ripple through the financial system for years to come. We provided a framework for analyzing possible implications of this shift for financial stability and used this framework to identify some mechanisms that reduce financial stability risks and others that increase them.

Notes
1. Moreover, the creation of some strategies, such as “factor” and “smart-beta” strategies, requires “active” choices about which factors to track and how to track them, but once rules are set, the strategy is executed passively (see, for example, BlackRock 2017). In addition, “active” decisions are needed to implement some indexing strategies, particularly for bonds.
2. The empirical analysis in this article uses Morningstar’s delineation of active and passive strategies.
3. Although the passively managed segments of the MF and ETF industries are smaller than the active segments, passive funds have attracted the bulk of net inflows (share purchases) from investors over the past two decades. From January 1995 to March 2020, cumulative net flows to passive MFs and ETFs totaled $5.2 trillion, compared with $1.8 trillion to active funds (source: authors’ calculations based on data from Morningstar).
4. These figures are based on the authors’ calculations using data from Bloomberg, Morningstar, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
5. On the underperformance of actively managed funds, see, for example, Johnson and Bryan (2017).
6. Some of the commentary on the active-to-passive shift has been quite colorful. For example, a 2016 AllianceBernstein note was titled “The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing Is Worse than Marxism.”
7. The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that MFs and SEC-registered ETFs offer daily redemptions.
8. As of March 2020, 97% of ETF assets were in passive funds (see Figure 1; source: Morningstar).
9. Among the ETFs that do offer cash redemptions, only about one-third of AUM (2.6% of the aggregate ETF total) is in funds that offer only cash redemptions; the rest is in funds that also offer in-kind redemptions. (We are grateful to our colleague Tugkan Tuzun for providing these figures, which are based on data from IHS Markit and his analysis.) ETFs that allow both cash and in-kind redemptions may revert to using only in-kind redemptions when liquidity is scarce (see, for example, Dietrich 2013).
10. Our discussion of ETF liquidity transformation focuses on primary-market activity, where financial institutions that serve as “authorized participants” (APs) interact with the fund to create and redeem ETF shares. For other ETF investors, such as retail investors, sales and purchases of ETF shares are secondary-market transactions with similar investors (not with the ETF itself) executed on stock exchanges. A fund’s liquidity transformation is less relevant for these transactions, which do not pressure the ETF to buy or sell its underlying securities. Some observers have raised concerns about conditions that may cause APs to curtail their primary-market activity, which can allow widening of deviations between ETF share prices and their net asset values. We discuss this issue in the section “Changes in Asset Valuations, Volatility, and Comovement.”
11. In September 2019, the SEC adopted a rule that facilitates launches of new ETFs by allowing them to operate without obtaining exemptive orders from the SEC (see www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf). The new rule helps standardize regulation of ETFs (Hu and Morley 2019). In addition, it could pave the way for faster ETF growth, although the number of ETFs has declined slightly since the rule went into effect, from 2,085 in November 2019 to 2,079 in March 2020 (source: Investment Company Institute; see www.ici.org/research/stats/etf).
12. Amid the financial turmoil associated with the coronavirus outbreak, MFs experienced significant outflows in March 2020. At the time of this writing, it may be too early to assess coronavirus effects on active and passive fund flows, but the experience is mixed so far. In the domestic equity sector, active funds had larger outflows in March (0.7%) than passive funds (0.4% inflows), but in the corporate bond sector, outflows were larger for passive funds (6.9%) than for active ones (2.5%).

13. The full set of explanatory variables for the regressions reported in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 1 includes three lags of net flows, contemporaneous returns, and three lags of net returns. We winorized net flows of the funds at the 1% level before aggregating. In our analysis, net flows are expressed as percentages of lagged aggregate assets.

14. Table 1 reports a selection of the estimated coefficients. Not reported in the table are coefficients on lagged flow, which generally are statistically significant, and those for the second and third lags of returns, which are not.

15. The interdependence between flows and returns complicates interpretation of the estimated coefficients on contemporaneous returns. Although endogeneity confounds inference about causality between contemporaneous flows and performance, the coefficient on contemporaneous returns is still quite relevant to financial stability. Fund flows might be destabilizing whether flows cause returns or vice versa, so the significantly smaller coefficient on returns for passive funds indicates some financial stability benefit.

16. The significant positive estimated coefficient on the Passive indicator (line 2) shows that passive stock funds grew faster than active ones during the 19-year sample period.

17. Moreover, adjusted $R^2$ for the active-fund regression is about triple that for the passive-fund regression.

18. The literature on mutual fund redemptions and liquidity risks highlights the importance of nonlinearities in the flow response to performance; see, for example, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) and Goldstein et al. (2017). We examined the possibility that aggregate flows respond differently to positive and negative performance but found little evidence of any difference.

19. To be sure, these strategies are not typical passive strategies, because they require high-frequency rebalancing and often the use of derivatives—features that distinguish them from most plain-vanilla ETFs and index funds. Nonetheless, we characterize these strategies as “passive” because their daily rebalancing is rule based rather than based on an active decision.

20. For example, when stock prices rise, a leveraged equity ETF’s net assets increase in even greater proportion, and the LETF must purchase stock or futures (or otherwise increase exposure) to keep its leverage on target. Meanwhile, an inverse ETF’s net assets fall, but its short position rises in value, so the fund must reduce the size of its short position (that is, increase net exposure) to stay on target.

21. Some nonregistered vehicles, such as leveraged and inverse exchange-traded notes, mimic the investment objectives of LETFs and also trade in the same direction as recent market moves. However, unlike their investment fund counterparts, these notes are debt obligations of financial firms rather than passive investment vehicles.

22. For an LETF with daily return $r$ and leverage $L$, same-day rebalancing flows, as a fraction of assets, must be $(L^2 - L)r$. Hence, for an LETF that promises either double the return of an index ($L = 2$) or the inverse of its return ($L = -1$), a 1% return on the underlying index would require same-day rebalancing flows equal to 2% of assets. In comparison, empirical analyses of the flow–performance relationship for mutual funds typically show that returns of the same magnitude lead to much smaller mutual fund flows in the same month. For example, in the regressions reported in Table 1, 1 percentage point increases in returns for active domestic equity funds and active corporate bond funds are estimated to result—putting aside the possibility of reverse causality—in additional same-month inflows to those funds of only 0.03% and 0.4% of assets, respectively.

23. To be sure, other investing strategies—including commodity trading advisers, risk-parity hedge funds, and managed volatility funds—probably exacerbated volatility in early February 2018 (see Gray and Wigglesworth 2018; Wigglesworth 2018). However, these vehicles generally have more discretion than truly passive strategies to avoid transactions in dislocated markets.


25. As we have noted, in September 2019, the SEC finalized a rule that streamlined the process of bringing ETFs to market. In November 2019, the SEC issued a proposed rule on the use of derivatives by mutual funds and ETFs (see www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2019/34-87607.pdf). The proposal would lift the 2010 moratorium on the creation of new LETFs and allow sponsors of LETFs to use the new streamlined registration process set forth in the September 2019 ETF rule.

26. The HHI is one of the most commonly used measures for market concentration. A rule of thumb is to regard HHI values of 2,500 or higher as indicating high concentration.

27. The high concentration for passive funds is also reflected in the combined market share of the 10 largest passive-fund asset managers, which has averaged about 90% of total passive-fund industry AUM since 2004.

28. Similarly, in 2014, outflows from PIMCO funds triggered by Bill Gross’s departure appear to have benefited other asset managers.

29. To be sure, index-inclusion effects may arise from activities other than passive (index) investing. For example, as we have noted, some nominally active investors engage in closet indexing, and this activity likely contributes to index-inclusion effects. Further complicating matters is the fact that investors have so many indexes to choose from; the Index Industry Association reports that there are more than 3 million stock indexes.
30. Similar results have been reported in the academic finance literature since Shleifer (1986) appeared. For example, Harris and Gurel (1986), Beneish and Whaley (1996, 2002), Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), and Petajisto (2011) all showed effects of inclusion in the S&P 500 on stock prices. Researchers have found evidence of price effects for inclusion in other indexes, too. For example, Madhavan (2003), Cai and Hougue (2008), and Petajisto (2011) all found inclusion effects for the Russell 2000 Index; Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) studied inclusion effects for the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index; and Chakrabarti, Huang, Jayaraman, and Lee (2005) found inclusion effects for the MSCI country indexes.

31. Some mitigation of this pressure probably would come from high-yield bond mutual funds, which presumably would purchase the downgraded bonds. This offset could be sizable, given that mutual funds own a larger share of high-yield corporate bonds outstanding than investment-grade corporate bonds (Barclays 2018). However, outflows from high-yield bond funds, which might accompany widespread bond downgrades, would reduce those funds’ bond-purchasing capacity.

32. In the section “Growth of Specialized Passive Investment Strategies That Amplify Volatility,” we discussed specialized passive investing strategies that can amplify volatility by forcing portfolio managers to trade in the same direction as same-day market moves, even in the absence of investor flows. Here, we discuss the broader effects of ETF ownership on asset prices and liquidity, whether those effects are due to trading by portfolio managers or investors.


34. See, for example, Vijh (1994); Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005); and Sullivan and Xiong (2012).

References


